MacIntyre & Moral Agency

1. MacIntyre identifies to main modes of moral judgment: 1) assertive and absolute judgment and 2) tentativeness to give any definite answer or identify universal principles underlying any judgment given. Because of their common inability to self-criticize, dialogue about any shared presuppositions is impossible. The result is thoughtlessness, a lack of self-knowledge.
   
2. We need a knowledge of the principles that direct our moral decisions - knowledge that is practical in nature - in order to have true moral agency.
   
3. Aristotle asks four sets of questions that focus on how moral agency can be instilled. The first deals with how we might distinguish between our desire to be satisfied and desire for objects for the sake of the object. The second questions how we can learn to act for the best in every present situation. The third examines how practice is to be unified with the agent's life. The fourth set questions what types of social relationships can foster and facilitate the achievement of goods.
   
4. The end result is that we need rigorous moral training, likened to training of tuna fishermen, that fosters reflection, teamwork, and individual striving. This training is necessary, though it may not be sufficient.
5. To gain moral agency, we must first engage in practices that instill reflection, teamwork, and individual striving rather than focusing on theories we could adopt. We can't simply be told what to think and how to act: we must experience what it means to make moral decisions.

MacIntyre first proposes that what we need for moral agency is thoughtfulness - "an unwilling[ness] to allow thought to rest content with unscrutinized metaphors or unidentified presuppositions" (3). How are we to attain this thoughtfulness?

MacIntyre argues that this manner of knowledge must be practical rather than theoretical (3). In order to be thoughtful, we must be able "to discriminate among the various objects of attention presented to us by our desires" - to be able to discern which objects we desire for their ability to satisfy a need rather than because of some external force. In essence, we must be aware of the nature of the objects and the source of our desires. MacIntyre elucidates this with the example of the influence of advertising, by which we can be unconsciously swayed to choose some product over another (3).

Our goal, then, is to become aware of these unknown influences over our desires. MacIntyre argues that, in order to gain this awareness, we must discuss and question our desires and about the practices in which we engage. He borrows “an agenda for practical reflection” (4) from Aristotle in the form of four sets of questions, through which we can realize the origins and goals of our desires.

First, we must examine whether the goods we wish to obtain are objects of desire for desire’s sake or because they are good for humans to obtain in general and for us to obtain in particular. Secondly, we need to consider how we might come to act in the best manner when faced with a situation that must be addressed without thinking. Thirdly, we must consider the necessity for unity within the moral agent’s life. Lastly, we should reflect on “the types of social relationship in and through which the goods of such practice are achieved” (4).

However, these questions cannot be our starting point for thoughtfulness. Before we can reflect, we must first deem it to be the most desirous action, which is not the popular choice in today’s world (as MacIntyre explains when he talks of the assertive and the uncertain modes of moral judgment, p. 1).

Gladly, MacIntyre does not rest complacent with this manner of reflection. This may explain how we can reflect on our desires once we wish to examine them, but not how we may come to desire that. Hence, MacIntyre proposes that we need a manner of training program – such as tuna fishermen experience – to instill three major qualities: teamwork, individual striving, and reflection.

Tuna fishermen have to have confidence in their own abilities, but also be aware of their limitations. They must be able to trust those around them in order to survive, both people in their immediate presence and the Coast Guard. The strenuous schedule, intense need for cooperation, and high level of danger make reflection necessary, as MacIntyre argues (7). Without this reflection, the fishermen would not be self-aware of their capabilities and limitations, hence putting the rest of the crew at risk.

So, to extend the analogy, our moral training needs to require teamwork, individual striving, and reflection. The training must be rigorous and structured so that we become aware of salient influences, but also so that we become engaged in the task of purging ourselves of negative influences.

So, then, can everyone be trained morally? If so, of what should the training consist—how would it require teamwork, individual striving, and reflection? If not, who gets to be trained, and how do we deal with those who are excluded?